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Property in the World: On Collective Hosting and 
the ‘Ownership’ of Communal Goods
Rhys Aston and Margaret Davies
1 Introduction
Law is typically located at the scale of the nation state and, as a result, 
discussions about law and hospitality have tended to emphasise issues 
of national sovereignty, national identity, and relationships to non-
citizen others. However, what remains a fundamental part of hospitality 
theory is the philosophical emphasis on hospitality as a dimension of 
the individual owner’s ethical responsibilities to the visitor as well 
as the constitutive reciprocity between host and guest. In Levinas, 
moreover, hospitality is a very personal matter – it is about opening the 
self to the other, as well as the home or the dwelling. Debates about 
hospitality always seem to contain an unresolved surplus of connections 
and disjunctions between these scales of nation, home, and subject. 
Movement between the frames of house/home and national territory, 
owner and sovereign, or ethics and politics seem theoretically routine, 
yet always suggestive that there is something unspoken or missing in 
the transition from self, to home, and to nation.
This article endeavours to explore some of these issues about the 
framing of hospitality by reference to the idea of property, which so 
often underpins the individual host’s ability to welcome a guest. In 
particular, we explore the ways in which the community enters into 
property discourse as the foundation for property rights and as an 
interest-bearer in a complex regulatory world. We argue that thinking 
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about hospitality from this angle opens up a number of unexplored 
questions about the interplay of self, other, and object in a social context.
2 Property and Hospitality
Property is essentially a private power (or private sovereignty) to 
exclude the other from use, access or enjoyment of a resource (Cohen 
1927; Gray 1991). In this sense, property appears to fit easily within 
the contours of a simple hospitality. The proprietor is always-already an 
owner in this dynamic, and is simply positioned as host, while others 
seeking access or use are positioned as guests. The relationship between 
proprietor-host and guest, and the implications of this relationship 
for their ethically-inflected identity, are foundational to the issue of 
hospitality. 
However, when we look more closely at theory concerning 
hospitality, as well as the legal notion of property, the situation 
becomes more complex because the concept of law, with all of its 
ambiguities, is never far from the recognition of property. In particular, 
the relationship between an owner and an object of property (such as 
a home) is normally a secondary relationship, an effect of the network 
of relationships between legal subjects. Recognition of subjects and 
the norms subsisting between subjects is prior to recognition of their 
nature as proprietors. In other words, there is never a pre-existing 
owner who has the capacity to show hospitality but rather (arguably) 
a person who already owes their status as owner to their relationship 
with others. As we will see, Derrida’s work on hospitality makes the 
reliance of the host on the guest particularly clear. However Derrida’s 
emphasis is on identity and relationality to the other as a person rather 
than as a basis for ownership. A variation on this dynamic is to be found 
in Hegel (1952), for whom recognition of the subject is co-extensive 
with recognition of her or his status as owner. Beyond the relationships 
between self and other, however, property theory now goes much 
further by accepting the social basis of ownership (Gray 2010: 192-193; 
Alexander and Penalver 2010). In sum, property is a tripartite dynamic 
of self, other, and object in the context of others at large, specifically, 
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the world against whom an in rem right is held.
The social nature of ownership makes possible another feature of 
its contemporary form, which is that property is increasingly regarded 
as a compromise between competing interests, namely the interests of 
private individuals and the community (Underkuffler 1990; Holder and 
Flessas 2008; Alexander and Peñalver 2009). This stands in contrast 
to the more usual idea of property as a unidirectional right held by a 
person to exclude others from the use of a thing. A good example of 
these competing interests are to be found in environmental and heritage 
law where the ‘rights’ of the proprietor are shaped by community 
interests in preservation of historical, aesthetic and ecological amenity. 
The public domain in intellectual property law, the open software and 
creative commons movements (Lessig 2002; 2004), and the developing 
consciousness about cultural heritage provide other examples where 
community and private rights remain in perpetual tension.
In this article we will reconsider the dynamics of hospitality in the 
light of these two structural features of property – that is, its social 
foundations and its balancing of community and private interests. 
First, we will consider what an emphasis on the tripartite and social 
basis of ownership adds to the conceptualisation of hospitality. Does 
the fact that property (for instance the home and the sense of self 
which goes along with it) is in a sense given by the political community 
and sustained by law, practice, and social values, alter the exchange 
between guest and host? Second, we will ask what the ethical limits 
of hospitality are when the other is not an individual guest but rather 
the world at large (or at least some significant portion of it). Equally 
problematically, what if the ‘guest’ already has a quasi-legal stake in 
the host’s domain? And what happens to the notion of hospitality if 
we view the community as host and private interests as the guest (the 
granting of proprietary rights being a form of ‘accommodation’ given by 
the community to the individual) as the concept of stewardship seems 
to imply? What do these changing constructs mean for the identity of 
the owner and the owner-object dyad?
Finally, we should note that the ‘welcome’ of hospitality generally 
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engages the relationship between host and guest, but it is also a 
welcome to something, such as a home or a nation. Yet to speak of 
hospitality in relation to a house or a home, as if it were essentially 
a physical place consisting of bricks and furniture controlled by a 
singular owner, obscures its constitutive elements and the relationships 
between them. These elements comprise its owner, and all human and 
non-human residents including (in pre-contemporary times) slaves, 
servants, agricultural animals and so forth. The relationships surface 
more strongly if we use the term ‘household’. 
Importantly, the Greek term oikos refers to house and household, 
and appears in modern English as the prefix ‘eco’ – as in economy and 
ecology. Both of these words refer to dynamic relationships of mutual 
reliance; an ‘ecology’ consists of connected organisms and micro-
organisms relating in a variety of ways (for instance as competitors, 
predators, parasites, scavengers, or mutual beneficiaries). Ecologies also 
have reciprocal host-guest (or non-reciprocal host-parasite) relationships 
which are not intentional – for instance, the whale has its barnacles, 
the human body has its gut flora, the tree has its possums, honeyeaters, 
and geckos. Thus, relatedness and hosting arise not only in the context 
of the social basis for owning a thing, or in the community interests 
which may be recognized as part of owning, but also in the nature of 
the thing to which the guest is being welcomed: intrinsically, it may 
be a web of relationships (like a nation) or ecology, rather than just a 
geo-political place or building. We will return to this point at the very 
end of the article because in some contexts these connections appear to 
bypass and render marginal any anthropocentric host-guest dynamic. 
There is perhaps no entirely satisfactory method of sorting through 
or synthesizing all of these complexities and we do not aim to do so 
here. Rather, the purpose of the article is to open up the theory of both 
hospitality and property by considering them side by side. In particular, 
we explore some aspects of hospitality theory which are in our view 
under-emphasised. These include the nature of the host’s right over 
the object (home, self, nation) which is being opened to the guest, as 
well as the impact of recognising the interests that the community has 
215
Property in the World
in private ownership. At the same time, we will also reflect on what 
hospitality discourse can offer to property theory, especially how it 
may provide a language and framework through which the collective-
individual and right-duty tensions can be explored.
3 Hospitality
The concept of hospitality has been a central trope in western thought 
circulating throughout religion, culture and philosophy. Phrases such 
as ‘welcome’, ‘come in’ and ‘make yourself at home’ are familiar to all. 
To welcome a stranger into one’s home, to provide shelter, food, and 
protection has long been viewed as an important, if not fundamental, 
religious and ethical obligation. However, it is also a complicated 
idea and one which carries deep contradictions. Narratives about 
hospitality centrally concern the relationship between host and guest. 
This relationship manifests in the ethical, as well as the political and 
legal, obligations and responsibilities subsisting between these two 
players. The relationship is also characterised by the existence of a 
number of tensions and risks which are not always possible to reconcile. 
The key to much of the theory, as well as to the stories of hospitality 
which underpin it, is that the identities of host and guest are mutually 
constitutive; there is both recognition and reciprocity involved in the 
exchange which leads to a mutual empowerment for host and guest, 
as well as a more troublesome expression of the host’s power over the 
guest, and vice-versa. This is evident in several features of hospitality 
– that it concerns an act of welcome, that the host opens his or her 
home to the guest, and that the guest recognises the host as such and 
bears the responsibility of not over-reaching in a way which would 
undermine the host. 
Much has been written about the relationship between host and 
guest. Our purpose is not to engage in this literature in detail but rather 
bring it into an engagement with property theory. Before getting to 
this point we need to briefly introduce a few key points, starting with 
Benveniste’s well-known etymological analysis (Benveniste 1973; cf 
McNulty 2007: viii-xii). As Benveniste explains, hospitality is derived 
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from a Latin term hospes which in turn is a compound of the more 
ancient inferred terms hostis and potis. These terms are each complex in 
their own way; Benveniste explains that potis is present in Sanskrit as 
‘master’ and ‘husband’, it is also present in Greek as ‘master’, appearing 
eventually as ‘despot’. As a term it is essentially indicative of power, but 
it also in other contexts means identity, oneself, himself. As Benveniste 
asks ‘Under what conditions can a word denoting ‘master’ end up by 
signifying ‘identity’? (1973: 73). (In this context we should note that the 
terms ‘proper’ and ‘property’ carry an overlapping set of significations 
including sameness, identity, propriety and right.) Hostis is also a 
complicated term, according to Benveniste’s analysis. It can refer to 
both the guest or ‘favourable stranger’ (1973: 75) as well as the enemy 
or hostile stranger. Eventually, Benveniste says, the term hostis ‘assumed 
a ‘hostile’ flavour’ (1973: 78). While this is not necessarily evident in 
the term ‘hospitality’, as subsequent theory has illustrated, there can 
nonetheless be an element of danger or risk buried in its dynamics. 
Tracy McNulty summarises the etymological relationship between 
the two roots in the following way:
When we put together these two roots – hostis and potis – we find 
that the institution of hospitality implies the union of two somewhat 
contradictory notions: a social or legal relationship defined by 
reciprocity and exchange, and despotic power, mastery, and personal 
identity. The ... relationship between them is far from stable and 
can develop in two fundamentally different directions. One way 
can result in a feeling of recognition and respect between host and 
guest, a reciprocal relationship of power and a mutual confirmation 
of one another’s mastery that is guaranteed by relations of debt and 
obligation.... The linking of hostis and potis suggests that hospitality 
implies not only the power of mastery, but power over the guest, by 
virtue of his debt or obligation to the host. For this very reason, the 
juxtaposition of the notions of reciprocity or exchange and mastery 
or power can have a very different result. It can be a source of anxiety, 
rivalry, or hostility, in which the host’s power over the guest is 
conceived in a threatening manner, or in which the guest threatens 
to overtake the host’s place as master by usurping his home, personal 
property, or social position (McNulty 2007: xi).
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Thus, in its etymological resonances, the term ‘hospitality’ conveys 
welcome, recognition, openness and respect, as well as the potential for 
conflict, absolute forms of power (in either direction), and an inbuilt 
but unexpressed hostility or at least dangerousness.  
Etymology is suggestive but not conclusive when it comes to the 
exposition of concepts and their associated dynamics. However, many 
of these tensions are also reflected in theory relating to hospitality. 
Again, we need to be brief, but some significant points must be 
outlined. Hospitality is centrally about a reciprocal relationship 
between host and guest, self and other, the at-home and the foreign; 
it is shaped fundamentally by ideas of boundaries and thresholds in 
that it presupposes them, as well as constructs and perpetuates them. 
As Derrida (1999) emphasises, hospitality consists of a welcome or 
opening of the self to the other, therefore, any instance of hospitality 
begins with an encounter with an ‘other’ or an outsider.1 The host 
offers her or his home to the stranger or visitor, which is, on one level, 
an act of generosity; however, as Derrida points out, this is also an 
act which reinscribes the division and power between host and guest 
because its condition is that ‘the one who receives, lodges or gives 
asylum remains the patron, the master of the household’ (Derrida 
2000c: 4). In providing hospitality, in granting access to the home or 
household, the host is always, at least implicitly, signalling their status 
as owner and reinforcing their legal rights and the power which stem 
from ownership. The act of hospitality is to some extent inhospitable, 
because in the first place it reinforces and reinscribes the power of the 
host, that is, their power to offer hospitality, and ultimately the mastery 
they hold over their domain.
At the same time, however, the reciprocal relationship which sits 
at the heart of hospitality simultaneously reinforces and challenges 
the host’s power. In opening their home to a visitor, the host risks 
usurpation from an unscrupulous guest: the host can potentially give too 
much, while the guest can also take too much, effectively challenging 
the host’s ownership and the very basis upon which hospitality can be 
offered. Hospitality is therefore always and inevitably conditional: if 
218
Aston and Davies 
a guest truly ‘made themselves at home’, this would ‘undo’ the host’s 
sovereignty and thus their power to offer hospitality in the first place. 
This may occur either because the host has been too hospitable, or 
because the guest failed in their duty not to overstay or take too much. 
Thus, in opening their house the host potentially becomes hostage to 
the guest by giving up too much, having too much taken. The positions 
can be reversed – with guest becoming host, and host becoming the 
guest (Derrida 2000b: 123-125; Leung and Stone 2009: 196).
There is another, and more fundamental, way in which this 
substitution of host-guest occurs, which is a central feature of Derrida’s 
conceptualisation of hospitality. Derrida’s work on hospitality is 
thoroughly indebted to Levinas, in particular, his assertion that 
subjectivity is formed through an ethical relation and responsibility to 
the other characterised by a pre-ontological welcoming of the other, 
an act of hospitality to the other. As Raffoul summarises it: ‘The 
welcome of the other defines the subject. As such, the subject is that 
very welcome, that very openness to the other’ (Raffoul 1998: 5).  In 
this way, our subjectivity, our sense of being-at-home and our ‘dwelling’ 
is constituted by an unconditional welcoming of the other, by an act of 
hospitality. The host, therefore, is always dependent on (and in a sense 
hostage to) the guest. Their identity as host, as master of their domain, 
is constituted through their relationship to the guest. 
Even if the reality of hospitality is that it is limited and reversible, 
as Derrida argues, it is nonetheless based on an ideal or an absolute 
form. The welcome, the opening of the home and the self, must be 
unconditional – we say ‘make yourself at home’ (meaning, ‘I want you to 
feel that this is your home’) rather than ‘here is what you can and can’t 
do in my house’ because such a welcome could be very unwelcoming 
(although so much always depends on tone and context). For Derrida, 
absolute hospitality (or the Law of hospitality)  represents hospitality in 
its purest form, capturing the essence or ideal of hospitality; it demands 
that we accept a stranger/guest into our home and show them unlimited 
and unconditional conviviality; it is a hospitality given to all without 
question, hesitation or limit; it is provided for the sake of itself, and 
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not out of a sense of reciprocity or debt. As he states:
absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give 
not only to the foreigner … but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous 
other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let 
them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking 
of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names 
(2000a: 25).
At the same time, absolute hospitality is itself a contradictory 
concept: it demands the unconditional welcome of the uninvited other, 
however, to be hospitable, it is necessary to greet the guest, to ask their 
name, to host them in their singularity, not simply as a generalizable 
other/‘serialised nobody’ (Barnett 2005: 13; See also Leung and Stone 
2010: 199-200). Absolute hospitality, therefore, isn’t simply the ethical 
position which is constantly undone or contaminated by the politics and 
pragmatism of conditional hospitality. Placing limits on hospitality may 
be the more ethical choice, constituting a more ethical relation to the 
other.  As Barnett argues, ‘This reading of the laws of hospitality undoes 
the lingering sense of logical and normative priority of pure ethical 
responsibility which pervades Levinas’ work and most commentary on 
it’ (Barnett 2005: 13). Nonetheless, the agreement between host and 
guest is that the guest does not make themselves entirely at home and 
acts responsibly within the limits of pragmatism or relationality (the 
laws of hospitality). These limits are normally unstated in the context of 
the personal hospitality one might offer as a householder, but become 
explicitly expressed as passport, visa, and many other requirements 
when hospitality is understood as an obligation of a nation-state to 
the non-citizen other. 
Actual hospitality is therefore limited, but can’t exist without an 
ideal of absolute hospitality. It is, in Derrida’s words, 
a self-contradicting concept and experience which can only self-
destruct …  produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the 
condition of its impossibility … which is to say, deconstruct itself – 
precisely – in being put into practice (Derrida 2000c: 5). 
Hospitality is contradictory both as a concept and as an experience; 
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it is impossible and yet entirely negotiable as an impossibility. We have 
all played the roles of host and guest, and experienced it as an incredibly 
fragile and nuanced performance which is reliant on each agent playing 
their part well. We enact the parts of ‘host’ and ‘guest’ in many contexts, 
negotiating the complex and unstated rituals and etiquettes which 
inform our behaviour, and worrying over the acceptable extents and 
limits of our roles. It is a delicate and risky performance, never far from 
ending in embarrassment and anxiety.
4 Self, Home and Nation
Theoretical articulations of hospitality rely on an often unspoken 
analogy of self, home and nation. In Levinas, hospitality is primarily 
about the opening of the self to the other. In fact, for Levinas, as we have 
mentioned, hospitality (or the ‘welcome of the other’) is constitutive 
of subjectivity itself, forming/designating an ethical relation to and 
responsibility for the other which precedes ontology and ultimately 
politics. The ethical relation in hospitality is ontologically prior to 
the subject. And while hospitality is often understood through the 
metaphor of the home or household, it has always spoken to a larger 
space – the community and the nation state – where the guest is 
the foreigner, or alien. Thinking about property through the lens of 
hospitality and vice-versa raises some conceptual issues about scale 
and space and also about the identities of host and guest. First, we 
encounter the issue of who is offering and who is accepting hospitality 
and in relation to what? Hospitality is often positioned as an individual 
matter, between one person and an ‘other’.2 When associated with law, 
however, debate has also frequently focused on the scale of the nation 
state.3 Nation-state and home are clearly comparable in this context 
and can often be substituted theoretically; what is true at one scale may 
often be true at the other.4 That this is the case should not however 
perhaps be completely unquestioned,5 a point we will return to in a 
moment. 
Kant’s much-analysed essay on ‘perpetual peace’ (in particular 
its ‘Third Definitive Article’) is a clear influence in this context; it 
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establishes a right, however minimal, of non-hostile reception of the 
other into a national territory, as follows:
Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy 
but of right. Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated 
as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. One may refuse 
to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; 
but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him 
with hostility. It is not a question of being received as a guest in one’s 
house, as a particularly benevolent convention would be needed in 
order to give him a claim to be treated as a guest for a certain length 
of time. It is rather a right of visit, a right of demanding of others that 
they admit one to their society. This right all men have by virtue of 
their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as on a 
spherical surface, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally 
tolerate the presence of each other. Originally, no-one had more right 
than another to a particular part of the earth (Kant 1795: 439).
The hospitality evoked here by Kant is clearly of the conditional 
type, a compromise in which all nations have the duty to treat strangers 
as friends rather than enemies. To use Derrida’s language, it specifies 
certain laws, conditions and qualifications, while leaving the Law or 
absolute essence of hospitality in its background. In the modern context, 
the obvious application relates to the rights of asylum seekers and the 
obligations which states have to offer refuge. There has been much 
written on these issues, which we will not repeat here (see  Benhabib 
2005; Gibson 2003; Kelly 2006; Wilson 2010). 
The transition in thinking about hospitality from an individual site 
where what is at stake is a welcome of the other into one’s home, to 
the quasi-legal imperative of a political collectivity draws on several 
structural similarities (cf Still 2010: 11). In each case there is a space 
over which an owner or political sovereign has a right of exclusion 
(a proprietary or sovereignty right) to which another – a foreigner, a 
guest, or asylum-seeker – seeks entry. In each case there is a threshold 
to cross and, as Benveniste emphasises, an inside-outside distinction: 
When an ancient society becomes a nation, the relations between man 
and man, clan and clan, are abolished. All that persists is the distinction 
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between what is inside and outside the civitas (Benveniste 1973: 78) .
In each case there is an ideal of welcome but a necessary set of 
limitations. And although the individual frame seems to align more 
easily with the notion of ethics while the national frame aligns with 
politics, in fact ethics and politics cut across both, as Judith Still makes 
clear:
 The distinction between ethics and politics (or law or rights) can 
be made in at least two ways: first, ethics is the domain of relations 
between individuals while politics is the domain of relations between 
States or between the individual and the State. More dramatically, 
ethics can be seen as the realm of metaphysical absolutes ... while 
politics is the realm of pragmatic compromise and of negotiated rules 
… (Still 2010: 8).
Following from this point, we could observe that there is a politics 
of hospitality when it is offered by one individual to another (and we 
must not forget that the personal is political) because of the necessary 
limitations of any opening of the home to an ‘other’, and also because 
of the distribution of power between host and guest. At the same time, 
there is an ethical dimension to state action which – however limited 
and compromised – may still ultimately resonate with the ideal of 
ethical openness to the other. 
Nonetheless, the realm of individuality and property is not co-
extensive with the realm of nationality and territorial sovereignty. 
While ‘oscillation’ between the levels may be productive (Still 2010: 
7), it is important that they not be conflated. Individual owner and 
sovereign are often analogised, as are the home and the nation, but are 
not the same thing. For a start, the owner and sovereign are differently 
positioned in relation to the collectivity which constitutes them as 
such: the owner is primarily an actual person embedded inside the 
collective, whereas the sovereign is the abstract product of it, and 
necessarily outside. More accurately, of course, we could say that both 
the individual and the sovereign are at the edges of the collectivity – 
neither inside nor outside – but nonetheless differently situated in 
relation to it. The sovereign acts in the name of the people while the 
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owner acts essentially in her or his own name. Similarly the identity 
of who provides hospitality, what it constitutes (ie exactly what is 
offered), and who is the stranger to whom it is offered, all vary between 
the micro and macro scales. And significantly, the right of ownership 
is differently justified and secured compared to the territorial rights 
of sovereignty – whereas law, custom, and the political community 
underpin ownership rights, there is arguably nothing but force, custom 
(again), and political pragmatism which underpin political sovereignty. 
This does not make property ownership more secure than territorial 
rights, just more removed in a sense from the issue of justification.
5 Relational Identities
Hospitality speaks to the host’s ethical responsibilities to a guest, but 
is always mediated through property or, in the case of the discourse of 
cosmopolitanism, through the nation state. The dynamic of hospitality 
at the level of the individual or family is based on a very specific 
paradigm, namely, that of the owner who has control over a domain 
and invites the other in. The dynamic of hospitality also presumes 
the originality of the relationship between the owner and the owned 
even if, as we have seen, the identity of the owner is nonetheless re-
constituted in part by her or his relation to the guest. There are arguably 
two absences in this simple model – first, the object of property and the 
nature of the right which the host has over it, and second, the political 
community which upholds the normative fabric from which such a 
right emanates. As we have seen, the political community does play 
a large part in hospitality theory, but most centrally in the context of 
the discourse of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, that is, where 
hospitality is regarded as a foundation for world peace. The political 
community plays little part in theorisations of individual hospitality 
but it remains, nonetheless, the basis of property, the pre-condition 
for such hospitality.6 This priority of the community does not derive 
from the (discredited) idea that law recognises and protects some pre-
existent ‘natural’ property, but because law (generally understood as 
nomos or normative world, not just positive law) is the entire framework 
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and precondition for property.
We will come back to the issue of the political communities and 
legal frameworks which construct property shortly. First, it makes sense 
to compare the structural properties of both property and hospitality. As 
we have seen, hospitality centrally concerns a relationship between host 
and guest, where the host is an owner and the guest a visitor of some 
description. Host-guest relationships, and the resulting problematics 
of power, identity, and conditionality, are prioritised here. The fact 
of ownership is present, but only appears in the background and as 
a precondition for the host-guest relationship.7 Looking at property, 
we see that it too only makes sense as a dynamic relationship between 
these same three structural positions: the subject or owner; other 
subjects, who appear primarily in the form of individual non-owners 
and the world at large; and the object of property (such as the home) 
which is the resource in relation to which the owner and other have 
rights and duties. Whereas in hospitality theory it is the subject-other 
relationship which is prioritised, in property theory the triangle is more 
evenly balanced – both subject-other, and subject-object are arguably of 
equal significance. This is despite the fact that ‘property’ is still often a 
shorthand reference for the thing which is owned, and retains a focus 
on the object (Bentham 1970: chapter XVI, s 26, n1).
Both property and hospitality theory concern reciprocity between 
a self and an other, one element of which is the identity of each, but 
in particular the host/self. It is interesting to recall in this context 
Benveniste’s analysis of the etymology of ‘hospitality’ and in particular 
the associations of potis with identity or ‘the person himself ’ (Benveniste 
1973: 74) and also in its derivatives with power and possession (1973: 74-
75). ‘Property’ and ‘proper’ elicit an adjacent but less self-contradictory 
set of senses, including authenticity, purity, propriety, and self-sameness 
(Davies 2007: 25). A property is also a characteristic or trait. These 
sometimes buried references have been made explicit and analysed in 
depth in theory relating to hospitality and property. 
As we have seen, hospitality is fundamentally about the relation 
between self and other, and the axiomatic role of this relation in the 
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formation of subjectivity and identity.  A great deal of property theory 
– in fact one might claim most property theory – addresses in some 
way the property-person nexus and its relation to identity. Locke, for 
instance, saw identity as essentially self-owning and argued from that 
basis that property involved a mixing of one’s self with the natural 
world (1988: 285-287). Hegel, by contrast, understood property as a 
stage in identity-formation: we put our immediate self into the external 
world and draw it back to ourselves as our own property which is not, 
however, rightful ownership until it is recognised by another person 
(that is, through contract) (Hegel 1952; cf Carlson 2000). 
Perhaps the most intriguing and potentially evocative structural 
parallel between hospitality and property is the operation of an ideal 
or absolute in the concept. As we have seen, hospitality is governed 
and also made impossible by the ideal form, in which hospitality 
ought always to be available and the home or nation completely open 
to whoever might arrive. This is, of course, out of the question in 
a practical sense. Property also arguably contains an ideal, but we 
could see it as taking almost the opposite form. This is what some 
have termed the ‘ownership model’ or even the ‘castle model’ (Singer 
2010: 59). This concept was explained most famously by Blackstone as 
‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe’ (1766: 2). The ideal of property 
consists in total power over an object and a claim that everybody else is 
excluded from that right. In resting on total exclusion rather than total 
welcome, it is the opposite of hospitality but is also the precondition 
for hospitality. Of course, to be precise, the entire universe is excluded 
from the right of property – I alone have the right to this book, this vase, 
this CD, this car. However, the content of the right is not exclusion 
but ‘excludability’ (Gray 1991: 268-269) or the ability to exclude or not 
exclude as the owner wishes and it is this excludability that opens the 
way for hospitality to be conceptualised and practiced. In summary, 
where absolute hospitality says ‘you must welcome the other’, absolute 
property says ‘you may welcome the other (but need not)’ or even ‘you 
must maintain boundaries’.
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This ideal of property is powerful and vast. It undoubtedly has an 
impact on both cultural and legal attitudes towards property. From the 
perspective of most property theorists, however, the ideal or absolute 
form does not operate as a desirable normative goal (as it often does 
in hospitality theory) or an aspiration built in to the property concept; 
instead, it is a rather a simplistic misrepresentation or ideological 
delusion (Alexander et al 2009). It is not just that the ideal of property 
is impractical, internally contradictory, and basically untrue as a 
description of property (which it is) but also that it is undesirable, 
premised as it is on an impoverished image of the person as separate 
from any social relationships (cf Nedelsky 1990; 2011; Davies 2012) 
as well as a complete and potentially destructive power over resources 
(Freyfogle 1989; Karp 1993). Thus, despite the existence of an ideal, 
property is regarded as intrinsically limited and contextual. Because it 
can only ever be embedded in relationships, the ideal – although it has 
conceptual and discursive force in certain situations – is fundamentally 
misguided. Regulation therefore does not represent a subtraction 
from the ideal or absolute form of property (see Gray 2007), but is 
rather intrinsic to the definition of property. As Gray says, ‘Property 
... is organic, interactive, socially defined, normatively resilient, and 
extremely relative’ (2010: 192-193). Contemporary property scholarship 
is frequently concerned with the contingency, fragility and the 
complexity of property, rather than its durability or universality. It is 
interesting again, to compare this to hospitality which in its non-ideal 
form says ‘don’t give everything away’ or ‘there are limits’. By contrast, 
property in its non-ideal form says ‘what you think you own has been 
given to you’ and ‘your property is owed to everyone else’.
Property centrally concerns a link between a self and an ‘other’ 
which is strongly mediated through an object which one possesses, 
controls, excludes others from, is excluded from, and so forth. By 
contrast, hospitality discourse recognises the object/home as a 
precondition to an ethical relationship but otherwise seems to leave it 
out of account. It is the territory or home under the control of the host 
and into which the guest is invited, but the legitimacy or justification 
of this ownership seems generally unquestioned and taken for granted.8 
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Without the home and this relationship of owning, no act of hospitality 
can take place. The object of property is the precondition for any act 
of hospitality, but from where or what does the fact and the right of 
ownership derive? As a less-frequently cited part of the passage from 
Blackstone states, 
Pleased as we may be with the possession, we seem afraid to look back 
to the means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in 
our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our 
favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those 
laws have been built (Blackstone 1766: 2).
For Blackstone, it seems that dominion, mastery and the ideal form 
of property are to some degree based on what much later generations 
of thinkers might refer to as a psychic foreclosure (Freud 1986: 564; 
Butler 1997: 23). Fear that our title may not be good, or that the laws 
which support it may be built on sand, prevents us from questioning 
ownership and our own identity as owner. One might even say that 
collusion between owners to foreclose the question of proprietary right 
founds us as a society of individual owners. Neither I nor my neighbor 
wants the question of justification to be raised, even though (and 
especially in a colonial context) our right is highly questionable. The 
problem, however, will not go away: what justifies property?
Answers to this question depend on whether it is approached 
pragmatically, philosophically, legally, or as a textual-discursive 
exercise. On a pragmatic level, the fact of ownership might be the 
result of simple appropriation such as in colonisation: I am at the 
present time in possession of this land, you have no physical or legal 
means to challenge me in my possession of it, therefore I have a right 
to my possession; I own it. The step from premises to conclusion 
seems completely unwarranted (deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’), but 
it is a common enough assertion, one which still forms the basis of 
the colonial acquisition of Australia, and now recognised as an act of 
state or raw power which cannot be questioned by the courts (Watson 
2002). For Kant, the abuse of hospitality evidenced by colonisers was 
a strong motivation to limit hospitality among nations to a right of 
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visitation (Kant 1795: 440).  A guest who overstays – at least where 
nations are concerned – becomes a resident. And of course, though 
a single factual instance cannot produce a norm, repetition can and 
does, though whether that ought to be elevated to a rule of law is a 
different question. Factual excludability, and the act of possession, is 
even recognised by law in limited contexts; for instance, the finder of 
an object holds good title against all but the rightful owner, the person 
who traps or kills a wild animal becomes its owner, while ‘adverse’ 
possession of real property still in some contexts and jurisdictions leads 
to real proprietary rights (see Katz 2010). 
In a legal context, however, the response to the question of what 
underpins ownership is clearer. Property is recognised by law, and 
law is a socially constructed and socially sustained set of norms. 
Property rights are nothing more or less than the product of a political 
community, with its own distinct history, cultural characteristics, 
and economic circumstances. The law – understood in the abstract 
as positive state-based law – does not justify itself by reference to any 
external source, because it has no need to. It is its own justification. 
At the same time, every time the law is interpreted and applied, every 
time an action is taken in accordance with the law or the way set down 
by law is followed, the action of doing so arguably presumes, asserts, 
and re-enacts a justification. In the case of property, this presumed 
justification may vary considerably according to circumstances – the 
‘thing’ has been appropriated, inherited, earned by labour, received in 
an exchange, given, won, redistributed, and so forth. Regardless of 
the means of acquisition and any moral or philosophically grounded 
justif ication for protecting that acquisition, in a sense the legal 
justification of ownership remains the same: it is simply that society 
collectively accepts a law which designates ownership in a particular 
case and refuses it in others (such as unjust enrichment, theft, fraud, 
unlawful copying etc).9 
The social basis of legal ownership is based on a logic which is, 
arguably, tautological: you don’t have a legal right to something unless 
the law recognises that right (the ‘law’ being entirely social). In addition 
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to the law, of course, there are cultural and social norms and practices 
of a less formal nature which supply the surrounding nomos. Clearly, 
property is not merely a legal construct but rather comprised of many 
sedimented and often contradictory layers of ideology, social values, 
historical practices and legal ordering. Its appearance in the legal and 
regulated world is, as Nick Blomley argues, a matter of performance; 
property is created or performed through material practices in the world 
(such as building a fence, deciding a case, planting a vegetable garden, 
buying and selling), but these practices are informed dynamically by 
ideas which are held about property by lawyers, by scholars, and indeed 
by everyone (Blomley 2013). Property is conditional, or contingent, on 
social acceptance as well as on the material enactments which reiterate 
social values and legal forms. In the normal lexicon, we say that the law 
recognises property but we could equally say that property is a gift from 
socially embedded law to the owner; without this basis there would 
only be forcefully-held possession. Disregarding the social aspect of 
ownership would elevate the object to a fetish – where the object exists 
in and of itself, and where the subject-object bond is more definitive 
than the subject-subject bond because the object itself is given identity-
conferring properties (Dant 1996; Schiermer 2011).
Property then, is always contextual, limited, and socially-based. But 
what does this mean for hospitality? The guest crosses the threshold, 
and is welcomed into a place of conditional and fragile rights, claimed by 
the host but generated and sustained by a society constituted (perhaps) 
by a generalised guest. Is it always in a sense the social entity which 
is being hospitable, not the individual? Is the ‘guest’ both a rightful 
recipient as well as a recogniser of property? 
At the very least, every act of hospitality bears the imprint of the 
social in that it can never be regarded as purely an act between two 
individuals. But does such a claim undermine a hospitality narrative 
based primarily on two individuals relating around someone’s home, 
or a state and an ‘other’ relating around access to a territory? In other 
words, does the fragility of the host’s right to the home into which the 
other is welcomed, alter in any way the host-guest relationship? Or are 
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we left in a situation where the limits of hospitality are simply intensified 
because the social-political-legal sphere of conditions and pragmatism 
pre-exists even the absolute form of hospitality? Perhaps we need also 
to emphasise the fragility of proprietary rights which lead us further 
into the interchangeability of host and guest. Our final section explores 
further (though not in a decisive fashion) some of these matters.
6 Looking for Equilibrium: Community and Individual 
It is relatively uncontroversial, then, to regard objects of property 
as things which are given to an owner by a political community. A 
logical extension of that, though not an uncontroversial one, is that the 
community itself has some interest in the thing. 
[I]n most contemporary property scholarship … the focus is often 
fixed firmly on the person of the ‘owner’, and all others reduced to 
the amorphous category of ‘nonowner’. This way of talking about 
ownership obscures the possibility that the ‘community’ may have 
a moral status that is distinct from those of neighbouring owners or 
nonowning individuals (Alexander and Peñalver 2010: xviii).
Not only does the community have a moral status, in many areas 
(such as environmental protection, heritage and planning law), the 
community also has a legal status, of sorts. That is to say, while the 
community at large may not be able to make a claim against an owner 
and generally does not have legal standing to enforce their interests, 
nonetheless these interests (such as ‘public amenity’ or historic, cultural, 
aesthetic, or spiritual value) are represented by others (eg local Councils) 
and these notions are given weight in legal frameworks.10 The point is 
clearly illustrated by numerous cases to do with everything from wind 
farms to garages. 
To explore this point further, we would like to take a brief detour 
around an example from suburban Adelaide which illustrates the 
complexities of conceptualising hospitality when common interests 
come into play. Mr Lacey lived on 1760m2 of land in one of the leafy 
eastern suburbs. His property contained (among other things) a house, a 
tennis court, a garage, and a tree.11 Mr Lacey’s tree was a large Eucalyptus 
231
Property in the World
scoparia or Wallangarra White Gum, approximately 14 metres high, 
with a canopy spread of over 13 metres, and a trunk circumference 
of 2.1 metres (when measured 1 metre above ground level). This last 
measurement proved problematic, because it put Mr Lacey’s tree into 
the legally-designated category of ‘significant’, meaning that he was 
not permitted to cut it down or otherwise damage it without Council 
permission. He sought permission from the Council to remove the tree, 
because – as many gum trees are in the habit of doing – it had dropped 
limbs and branches onto his land and tennis court. He feared for his 
safety, as well as for the safety of his family and visitors. The Council 
refused the application to remove the tree and Mr Lacey appealed to 
the District Court of South Australia and then to the Supreme Court 
of South Australia. Both courts refused his appeal and stated that 
remedial measures such as ‘a regime of periodic amputations of those 
of its limbs which are prone to fall’ ought to be tried first before taking 
the drastic action of a ‘final, life-ending decapitation’.12 
Cases such as these are no longer rare and in fact may even be said 
to represent a new ‘norm’ of private property – that is that it is not 
so much about protecting a domain of individual freedom where the 
owner may do as they like with their property, but rather that it is a 
balancing act between the interests of the individual owner and those 
of the community. Similar examples abound which bring into play 
heritage, environmental protection, and other aspects of development, 
for example ‘quasi-public’ spaces such as shopping malls and other 
privately-owned commercial zones.13 Such instances clearly change and 
in many respects reverse the already intrinsically reversible dynamics 
of hospitality. Consider, for instance, the following: by virtue of the 
‘public amenity’ of the tree – its contribution to the landscape as a 
‘prominent evergreen vegetated form’14  – Mr Lacey could no longer, 
one assumes, freely offer hospitality to his guests. At the very least, 
use of the tennis court was, he said, limited. The potential to offer 
hospitality which in some respects marks Mr Lacey as an owner is 
diminished by the unwelcome intrusion of public values – the aesthetics 
of the streetscape, the significance of large trees, and the character 
of the locality. There can be no absolute or ideal of hospitality under 
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such conditions because the owner is not free to give away himself by 
giving away what he owns. He owns the tree but, because it cannot 
be cut down, it cannot be given away except by also giving away the 
land upon which it sits). More to the point, Mr Lacey’s guests may be 
limited in their use of the tree by the danger it poses. 
In addition, there is arguably a reversal of the ordinary guest-host 
dynamics to be observed in such cases. Mr Lacey is obliged by law 
not to damage his tree. He tried to get rid of it, but the court said that 
before doing so, he was required to try to maintain it in a safe condition 
by pruning. Mr Lacey is still by law regarded as the primary owner, 
but he is turned into a stranger – the one who solicits the favour of 
the community. Or, we could say, like Derrida, that Mr Lacey is no 
longer host but hostage (Derrida 2000: 107) – constrained by the laws 
of hospitality to provide his property in a fit state to the community. 
The tree owner is situated as both host and guest or as both inside 
and outside his own rights. At the same time, the community and its 
constitutive subjects remains guest in the ordinary dynamic relating to 
Mr Lacey’s private rights, but nonetheless plays host to his enjoyment 
of his own tree. The gift of the tree by the community to the owner 
is foregrounded here – it becomes the necessary condition of any 
ownership and thus, of hospitality.
We must then ask who is the foreigner and who is at home here? 
Mr Lacey had to seek permission from a series of increasingly powerful 
legal gatekeepers in an unsuccessful effort to destroy his property. 
Compared to many such litigants, perhaps, Mr Lacey was relatively 
privileged or at least one assumes so since he had the resources to appeal 
a Council decision twice, but he was nonetheless ‘at the mercy’ (as the 
idiom goes) of the courts. The point is underlined in the penultimate 
sentence of the Supreme Court judgment, where Kourakis J suggests 
that Mr Lacey could have saved himself some extra time and expense 
had his original application been drafted differently.15 (In the end, 
is everyone a foreigner in the court system?) As Derrida reminds us, 
Socrates becomes a foreigner in the courts:
He declares that he is “foreign” to the language of the courts, to the 
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tribune of the tribunals: he doesn’t know how to speak this courtroom 
language, this legal rhetoric of accusation, defense, and pleading; 
he doesn’t have the skill, he is like a foreigner. (Among the serious 
problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner who, inept 
at speaking the language, always risks being without defense before 
the law of the country that welcomes or expels him; the foreigner is 
first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality 
is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. ... 
(Derrida 2000a: 15)
The courts hold the power, so it is not they who are foreign. Rather, 
the person appearing before the court is the foreigner and has the 
obligation of translating imposed upon him or her. 
A variation (or perhaps extension) of this issue arises when the 
holder of property is not cast as an owner but rather as a steward who is 
responsible both to present and future generations to maintain and even 
improve his or her property (Karp 1993; Lucy and Mitchell 1996). The 
concept of stewardship, used increasingly in environmental contexts, 
makes explicit the obligations owed to community and to resources 
and again raises questions about hospitality. The steward is obliged to 
care for the resource – for instance the land onto which the stranger is 
welcomed – but what if care for the land precludes any welcome? At the 
very least, the steward is more limited in the hospitality they can offer. 
As we have seen, the owner-host has the capacity to offer everything, 
even if this would in the end destroy his or her ability to remain a 
host. On the other hand, the steward by their very nature cannot offer 
all – they have first a duty to the resource, to the community and to 
the future to sustain it.
Finally, and to return to a point which we made at the outset, 
we should not forget that Mr Lacey’s property is in fact an oikos, a 
household; more specifically, it is an ecology unbounded by the limits of 
human property. A tree such as this one must itself be host to a multitude 
of animals, insects, and other organisms, some of which live entirely 
within it, and others of which use it as one of many places to visit. It 
is part of a complex urban ecology which includes humans, but is not 
centred upon us or controlled by us; it has its own rhythms, processes, 
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relationships, and limits. The tree’s status within the ecological context 
highlights the anthropocentric nature of the hospitality discourse which 
this article has considered. What goes on between a tree and its guests 
is beyond the realm of human ethics and law. On the other hand, law 
and ethics are increasingly being conceptualized with reference to the 
non-human and in particular to environmental factors. The law is now 
protecting the tree’s status as ‘host’, and the animals, birds, insects, and 
reptiles as ‘guests’. Speaking in this way is possibly meaningless and 
requires another analysis altogether, though as a final observation on 
this issue we would point out that here too the host and guest occupy 
interchangeable and reciprocal positions: the very concept of an ‘ecology’ 
emphasizes the inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of all elements 
of a living environment.
7 Conclusion
This article has explored the productive interactions and tensions of 
theory relating to property and hospitality. We have attempted to 
read these two paradigms side by side and in a sense each through 
the other, an exercise which has identified some absences, conflations, 
convergences and contradictions. We have focused on unpacking 
property as a precondition for hospitality, and reflecting upon how 
the collective aspects of property may complicate our thinking about 
hospitality – in particular the fact that all property is socially based, 
and the fact that property is increasingly balancing collective and 
private interests. At the same time, hospitality theory may lead to 
some novel conceptualisations for property thought, especially as we 
deploy a language concerned with welcome and reciprocity, as opposed 
to exclusion and limitedness. Focusing in on property highlights the 
movement between different scales of analysis which is characteristic 
of much hospitality theory – a slippage which is at once productive 
and in some senses problematic. We have also emphasised the ways in 
which the tripartite structures of property and hospitality are unsettled 
by the presence of a collectivity, and how the relationships within 
the triangle can be balanced or emphasised differently in different 
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contexts. All of this illustrates the difficulty of pinning down both a 
‘moment’ of hospitality and a secure form of property. We have raised 
a large number of questions and offered only partial answers which, 
nonetheless, point towards a slightly altered understanding of both the 
host-home-guest and the owner-object-non-owner relationships.
Notes
 1 It is important also to note that in Levinas (1969:27) this encounter, and 
the act of hospitality it occasions, actually constitutes subjectivity.
2 While in some ways this is exemplified in Levinas’ construction, it is 
clear that his analysis is not meant to capture actual, literal individuals or 
conduct. Rather, it is a ‘metaphysical’ self and other which is at the centre of 
his analysis. It is meant to capture, as Barnett notes, ‘a forgotten dimension 
of human relations … [an] ethical substratum of human relating…’ (2005: 
9) (see also Popke 2003: 304).
3 See, for instance, the special edition of Parallax (2005) 11:1 which focused 
on political asylum and hospitality.
4  See Gauthier 2007.
5 Cf Still 2010: 6.
6 There is admittedly some minimal recognition of the role of law and politics 
as the basis for property in Derrida, though it is not analysed in detail. He 
says, ‘in defining hospitality in all its rigour as a law … Kant assigns to it 
conditions which make it dependent on state sovereignty, especially when 
it is a question of the right of residence. Hospitality signifies here the public 
nature (publicité) of public space, as is always the case for the juridical in 
the Kantian sense; hospitality, whether public or private, is dependent on 
and controlled by the law and the state police’ (Derrida 2001: 22).
7 As we have indicated above, the fact of ownership is problematised in 
Derrida’s analysis of the exchange of positions between host and guest. 
Nonetheless their ‘original’ position relies on an assumption that the host 
owns something.
8 See Gauthier 2007: 160-163, discussing Levinas’ views on the home.
9 Cf Cohen 1954: 371-373. 
10 See eg, Heritage Places Act 1993 (SA) s16.
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11 Lacey v City of Burnside [2008] SAERDC 75, [2].
12 Lacey v City of Burnside [2009] SASC 136, [5].
13 See Gray and Gray 1999; Bottomley 2007; Layard 2010.
14 Lacey v City of Burnside [2008] SAERDC 75, [15].
15 ‘Mr Lacey’s present concerns would have been largely avoided if an 
application in the alternative, for hard pruning or removal, had been made 
in the first place’, Kourakis J, Lacey v City of Burnside [2009] SASC 136, 
[46].
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